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CASENOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ANOTHER CHAPTER IN THE COLLECTIVE ENTITY DOCTRINE-Braswell v. United States, 108 S.
Ct. 2284 (interim ed. 1988).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In several decisions over the last seventy-seven years the United
States Supreme Court addressed whether corporate representatives
may refuse to produce corporate documents pursuant to a government
subpoena. 1 Corporate representatives have often refused to produce requested documents on the ground that such compliance would provide
personally incriminating testimony that is protected under the fifth
amendment. 2 The Supreme Court historically has addressed the issue
by applying the "collective entity doctrine."3 Simply stated, the doctrine provides that collective entities such as corporations,4 partnerships 5 and labor unions6 do not enjoy fifth amendment rights. 7 When
1. The Supreme Court first considered this issue in 1911. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
316, 367 (1911). The most recent Supreme Court decision regarding this issue occurred in 1988.
Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 2286 (interim ed. 1988). In addition to the two above
decisions, the Supreme Court has addressed this issue in at least six other decisions that have
involved either corporate representatives or collective entity representatives. See infra notes
54-143 and accompanying text; see also Essgee Co. of China v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 158
(1923) (officer of corporation must turn over its books even though said books contain incriminating information); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 490 (1913) (corporation books are
property of the corporation and corporate officers have no constitutional right to hold them when
demanded).
2. See Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2286 Essgee Co. of China. 262 U.S. at 152; Grant v. United
States, 227 U.S. 74, 77 (1913); Wheeler, 226 U.S. at 484; Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 399,
400 (1911); Wilson, 221 U.S. at 370 (1911).
3. See Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286; Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1974);
Essgee Co. of China, 262 U.S. at 155, 158; Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 80 (1913);
Wheeler, 226 U.S. at 489-90; Dreier, 221 U.S. at 400; Wilson, 221 U.S. at 377-79. The "collective entity doctrine" is a principle applied by the courts in cases in which collective entities or
their representatives have attempted to obtain fifth amendment protection regarding the contents
of subpoenaed documents or the testimonial communications created by the act of producing documents. In such cases, the doctrine bars fifth amendment protection of self-incriminating evidence.
4. Hale v. Henkle, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) (holding that a corporation possesses no fifth
amendment privileges).
5. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 93 (neither partnerships nor their partners have fifth amendment
protection regarding partnership documents).
6. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944) (labor unions are collective entities
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an individual acts on behalf of an entity, he or she is considered to be
acting in a representative capacity. 8 Thus, the Supreme Court has held
that when acting in a representative capacity, the individual relinquishes the personal rights he or she normally possesses. 9 Instead, the
individual possesses rights commensurate with those of the entity."0 For
this reason, a corporate representative is not afforded fifth amendment
rights.'.
Although the doctrine appears straightforward, its proper application has become uncertain in light of recent Supreme Court decisions 2
altering the standard of review that had been used to evaluate the doctrine's applicability."3 Before 1976, the Supreme Court based the application of the collective entity doctrine on a privacy standard." Under
the privacy standard, entity representatives received fifth amendment
protection if the subpoenaed documents were the representative's "private writings."'" The Court abandoned the privacy standard in the
1976 decision of Fisher v. United States. 6 The Fisher Court adopted a
new standard that focused on whether a representative's act of producing subpoenaed documents constituted testimonial and incriminating
evidence to be afforded protection under the fifth amendment.1 7 The
Fisher standard, however, created confusion in the circuit courts, and
caused the courts to split in their application of the new standard. 8

possessing no fifth amendment privileges).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 699.
9. Id. Under the collective entity doctrine, the individual waives his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination when he is acting on behalf of a collective entity. See id.
10. Id.
II. When closely-held corporations are involved, the issue of whether a corporate representative should lose his or her fifth amendment protection becomes difficult. See In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 192-93 (5th Cir.), affd sub nom., Braswell v. United States, 108 S.
Ct. 2284 (interim ed. 1988). The difficulty arises because the operation of a closely-held corporation often resembles the operation of a sole proprietorship. Since sole proprietorships may be afforded fifth amendment protection, United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1984), it has
been argued that corporate representatives should likewise be afforded fifth amendment protection. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 190-91.
12. See generally Doe, 465 U.S. at 613-17 (fifth amendment protection for sole proprietor's
act of producing documents); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408-11 (1976) (no fifth
amendment protection to taxpayer's production of documents).
13. See Heidt, The Fifth Amendment and Documents Cutting Fishers Tangled Line, 49
Mo. L. REV. 440, 470-81 (1984); Comment, The Right Against Self-Incrimination by Producing
Documents: Rethinking the Representative Capacity Doctrine, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1605, 1614- 24
(1987).
14. See supra notes 65-109 and accompanying text.
15. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377-78 (1911); See also infra notes 65-109
and accompanying text.
16. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
17. Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
18. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir.), affd sub noma., Braswell v.
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The First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits did not follow
Fisher, and therefore, refused to acknowledge that collective entity representatives are entitled to fifth amendment protection.19 The Second,
Third, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits followed the new standard, thus
allowing entity representatives to enjoy fifth amendment protection."
Consequently, the conflicting circuit court interpretations made it difficult to determine the proper application of the collective entity
doctrine.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the case of Braswell v.
United States2' in order to resolve the conflict among the federal circuit courts.2 2 This note discusses Braswell and the history of the collective entity doctrine. In addition, it analyzes the Supreme Court's holding in Braswell to determine the proper application of the collective
entity doctrine. Finally, this note states a conclusion based in part on
the Court's holding and in part on logical deductions derived from an
analysis of the Court's decision.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Mr. Randy Braswell was the president and sole shareholder of two
Mississippi corporations, Worldwide Machinery Sales, Inc. and Worldwide Purchasing, Inc.13 In 1986, a federal grand jury issued a subpoena
duces tecum to Braswell as president of Worldwide Purchasing, Inc.

United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (interim ed. 1988).
19. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (85-W-71-5), 784 F.2d 857, 861 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 918 (1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 148
(6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1033 (1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Lincoln),
767 F.2d 1130, 1131 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Malis, 737 F.2d 1511, 1512 (9th Cir.
1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargus), 727 F.2d 941, 945 (10th Cir.), cert. denied. 469
U.S. 819 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings United States, 626 F.2d 1051, 1053 (1st Cir.
1980).
20. See In re Grand Jury No. 86-3 (Will Roberts Corp.), 816 F.2d 569, 574 (11th Cir.
1987); United States v. Sancetta, 788 F.2d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d
1235, 1240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 574 (1986); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768
F.2d 525-38 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc).
21. 108 S. Ct. 2284 (interim ed. 1988).
22. Id. at 2287. The Braswell Court stated, "[w]e granted certiorari to resolve a conflict
among the Courts of Appeals." Id.
23. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190-91 (5th Cir. 1987), affd sub nona., Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2284. In 1980, Braswell incorporated Worldwide Machinery Sales, Inc. Id. at
191. In 1981, Braswell formed a second corporation, Worldwide Purchasing, Inc. Id. In accordance with Mississippi law, both corporations kept current corporate books, financial records, minutes and corporate income tax returns. Id.; Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-99 (1972). Mississippi law
requires that every corporation have no less than three directors. Id. § 79-3-69 (1972). Braswell's
corporations had the same directors: Mr. Braswell himself, his wife, and his mother. In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 191. Braswell's mother and wife occupied the offices of vice-president and secretary-treasurer, respectively, in both corporations. Id. Braswell claimed his wife and
mother had no authority in the affairs of either corporation. Id.
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and Worldwide Machinery Sales, Inc.2 4 The subpoena requested that
Braswell produce documents25 from both corporations for the years
1982 through 1985.28
Braswell moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that his act
of producing the requested documents would be self-incriminating, and
therefore, would violate his fifth amendment rights. 7 The district court
denied his motion, concluding that the "collective entity doctrine" prevented Braswell from claiming protection under the fifth amendment. 8
Hence, Braswell was required to comply with the subpoena .2 He appeared before the grand jury, but refused to produce the documents
requested by the grand jury. 0 Pursuant to a government motion, the
district court held Braswell in contempt of court. 1
Braswell appealed his contempt citation to the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals.3 1 On appeal, Braswell presented a number of arguments to
support his claim that "his personal privilege against self-incrimination
justif[ied] his refusal to produce the [subpoenaed] corporate documents."' 33 Braswell argued that the fifth amendment privilege which
applies to sole proprietorships should also apply to closely held corporations for the same reason.34 Braswell cited Doe v. United States,5 in

24. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286.
25. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 190-91. The subpoenas gave Braswell two
alternatives. Id. He could give the requested documents to the agent serving the subpoena or he
could present the documents directly to the grand jury. Id. The subpoena did not require him to
testify verbally. Id.
The subpoena requested the following: receipts and disbursement journals; general ledger
and subsidiaries; accounts receivable/accounts payable ledgers, cards, and all customer
data; bank records of savings and checking accounts, including statements, checks, and
deposit tickets; contracts, invoices - sales and purchase - conveyances, and correspondence;
minutes and stock books and ledgers; loan disclosure statements and agreements; liability
ledgers; and retained copies of Forms 1120, W-2, W-4, 1099, 940 and 941.
Braswell. 108 S. Ct. at 2286 n.l.
26. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 191 n.1.
27. Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 2286 (interim ed. 1988).
28. Id. At the district court hearing on the subpoena, Braswell argued that the "collective
entity doctrine" did not apply in his situation. Id. He claimed the rule is inapplicable when "a
corporation is so small that it constitutes nothing more than the individual's alter ego." Id. The
district court rejected his argument. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir.),
aff'd sub nom., Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2284. The district court agreed that Braswell operated his
business like a sole proprietorship. Id. Nevertheless, the district court stated that Braswell was
doing business through the corporate form. Id.
29. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 192.
30. Id.
31. Id. Braswell's incarceration for contempt was stayed, pending appeal. See id.
32. Id. at 190.
33. Id. at 191.
34. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 192. Braswell contended that his corporations were formed for appearance only. Id. He claimed that his corporations were not formed
"for tax purposes, for limitation of shareholder liability, or for the creation of pension or profit
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which the Supreme Court stated that the sole proprietor had a fifth
amendment privilege when his act of producing documents involved
testimonial self-incrimination.3 6 Braswell contended that since he operated his corporations as if they were sole proprietorships, 3 7 Doe was
applicable in his case. 8
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that Doe did not apply
to closely-held corporations.3 9 The Braswell court of appeals cited another Fifth Circuit decision which stated that Doe did not extend act of
production privileges to representatives of collective entities.40 For this
reason, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Braswell's arguments that Doe enabled him to assert fifth amendment privilege. 41
Braswell's second argument contended that closely-held corporations were not collective entities. 42 Braswell supported his argument by
contending that the holding in the Supreme Court decision of Bellis v.
United States 3 excluded closely-held corporations from the collective
entity doctrine. 4 ' Therefore, Braswell argued that his refusal to produce
the requested documents was protected by the fifth amendment.' 5
Braswell's reliance on Bellis was misplaced. The Braswell Fifth

sharing plans. ' Id. at 192 n.3. Braswell contended that the manner in which he operated his
corporations had not changed from the manner in which he operated the same businesses when
they were sole proprietorships. Id. at 192.
35. 465 U.S. 605 (1984). Doe owned several sole proprietorships. Id. In 1980, the sole proprietorships' records were subpoenaed by a grand jury investigating corruption. Id. Doe refused to
produce the records on the ground that his act of production would provide self-incriminating
testimony protected under the fifth amendment. Id. at 608.
36. Doe, 465 U.S. at 613 n.l 1,614 n.12. The United States Supreme Court in Doe deferred
to the findings of the district court and the court of appeals below. Id. According to the Doe court,
when one produces requested documents he admits the documents exist, the documents are in his
possession, and the documents are authentic. Id. at 613 n.l . Whether these three "tacit averments ... are both 'testimonial' and 'incriminating' for the purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment ... depend on the facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof." Id. at 613.
(quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)) In Doe, both courts below found that
the government could not show it actually knew the requested documents were in existence, or in
Doe's possession. Id. at 613, 613 n.l, 614, 614 n.12. For this reason, the courts below found that
Doe's act of producing the documents constituted testimonial self-incrimination. Id.
37. See supra note 34.
38. See In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 192.
39. Id. at 193.
40. Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals cited In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Lincoln),
767 F.2d 1130, 1131 (5th Cir. 1985), which held that Doe did not reject the holding in Bellis, 417
U.S. at 85. According to Bellis, representatives of collective entities possess no fifth amendment
privilege regarding the production of entity records. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100-01.
41. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 191 (5th Cir.), affd sub nom,. Braswell v.
United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (interim ed. 1988).
42. Id.
43. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
44. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 191'-92.
45. Id.
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Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Bellis, stated that collective entities
are organizations independent from their individual members."6 Here,
Braswell operated his businesses as corporations, and consequently, the
corporations existed as separate legal entities that were distinct from
Braswell as an individual."7 For this reason, Braswell's corporations, regardless of form, were collective entities. 8
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Braswell district
court's judgment . 9 The Fifth Circuit stated that it was bound by the
precedent of its jurisdiction which supported Bellis.5 0 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Braswell, as custodian of corporate documents, did not have a privilege with respect to production of documents
under the fifth amendment. 1 Braswell appealed to the United States
Supreme Court and certiorari was granted.5 2 In a 5-4 decision, the
United States Supreme Court held that Braswell "could not resist the
subpoena for corporate documents on the ground that the act of production might tend to incriminate him." 53
III.

BACKGROUND

The United States Supreme Court has developed the collective entity doctrine through a line of decisions over the last eighty-two years. 5
Since its inception, however, the doctrine's scope has changed. Originally the doctrine applied strictly to corporations. 55 As time progressed,
the Supreme Court found that a number of unincorporated organiza-

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. Braswell's third argument contended that some of the papers requested were "private writings," and as such he claimed they were protected under the fifth
amendment. Id. at 191.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did not address this issue. At the district court's hearing on
Braswell's motion to quash the subpoena, the district court only considered the issue regarding
Braswell's act of production. Id. at 192. For this reason, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that Braswell's claim regarding fifth amendment protection of private papers was not an
issue that the Fifth Circuit should review on appeal. Id. at 192 n.2, 193.
49. Id. at 193.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 2287 (interim ed. 1988).
53. Id. at 2295. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court's opinion. Id. at 2286. Justices
White, Blackman, Stevens and O'Conner joined Rehnquist. Id. Justice Kennedy wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Scalia. It is interesting to note that
Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia split from the conservatives in the majority and joined with
the more liberal members of the Court, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, in dissenting.
54. See id. at 2284; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85 (1974); Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957); United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694 (1944); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361 (191 1); Hale v. Henkle, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
55. See Hole, 201 U.S. at 74-75.
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tions constituted collective entities within the scope of the doctrine.5 6
In addition to the change in scope, the standard upon which the
doctrine is based also changed. Prior to 1976, the Supreme Court based
the application of the collective entity doctrine on a privacy standard.5 7
According to the Court, records of collective entities were not considered to be private.5 8 Thus, prior to 1976, an entity representative was
unable to invoke his personal privilege against self-incrimination when
documents were subpoenaed, since the documents were not his "private
papers." 59 The documents were the property of the entity which was
not considered to possess fifth amendment protection."
Since 1976, the Supreme Court has based the application of the
collective entity doctrine on a compelled testimony standard."1 In applying the compelled testimony standard, the Court addressed whether
the entity representative's act of producing requested documents creates testimonial self-incriminating evidence.6 2 If the act of producing
documents involves testimonial self-incrimination, the representative
enjoys the protection of the fifth amendment.6 3 However, despite the
change in the standard, the doctrine has actually remained essentially
the same: The records of collective entities "are not private and there'
fore are not protected by the Fifth Amendment."64
A.

Development of the Privacy Standard

The Supreme Court first considered the fifth amendment rights of
a collective entity in Boyd v. United States. 5 Boyd argued that the
fifth amendment shielded him from producing records of his partner-

56. See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100-01 (Partnerships); McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372,
380 (1960) (Civil Rights Congress); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1951) (Communist Party of Denver); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1950) (Joint AntiFascist Refugee Committee); White, 322 U.S. at 705.
57. See Heidt, supra note 13, at 440-60; Comment, supra note 13, at 1605-14.
58. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 88-100; see also infra notes 65-109 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 65-109 and accompanying text.
60. Id.
61. See infra notes 120-42 and accompanying text.
62. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410-11 (1976). The Fisher Court explained
that an individual's act of producing documents communicated testimony by showing the documents exist, the documents are in fact the items requested and the documents are in the individual's control. Id. According to the Fisher Court, if these tacit averments create testimony not
originally known by the party requesting the documents, the testimony created in the act of production would constitute self-incriminating evidence. Id. at 410-13.
63. Id.
64. Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 2290 (interim ed. 1988).
65. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd involved a partnership that was ordered by the district court
to produce an invoice pertaining to glass that it had imported. Id. at 618. Boyd produced the
requested invoice but protested the constitutionality of the law that compelled this production. Id.
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ship that were to be used against him in court. 66 The Supreme Court
agreed. 7 Writing for the Court, Justice Bradley stated that the fifth
amendment prohibits any "invasion of . . .[an individual's] indefeasible right of personal security . . . and private property." 8 For this reason, the "compulsory production of. . .[Boyd's] private books and papers . . . compel[led] him to be a witness against himself, within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment." 9
The Boyd holding created a privacy standard regarding the protection of requested documents. 70 This broad standard afforded fifth
amendment protection to all private papers. 71 If the person being subpoenaed personally owned or possessed the requested property, he was
7
protected by the fifth amendment. 1
The next collective entity case the Supreme Court considered was
Hale v. Hinkle.73 Hale involved a corporate officer who invoked the
fifth amendment on behalf of his corporation.7 1 Justice Brown, writing
for the Hale Court, stated that the corporation had no fifth amendment
privilege. 75 Justice Brown explained that a "corporation is a creature of
the state."1' 6 According to the Court, the state vested the corporation
with special privileges and franchises.71 Therefore, the corporation
could not now refuse a state's request to produce documents when these
78
privileges allegedly had been abused.
The Court's decision in Hale created an exception to the privacy
standard set in Boyd. After Hale, corporate documents were no longer
considered "private papers" protected by the fifth amendment. 71 Consequently, the privacy standard pronounced in Boyd was narrowed.
Seven years after Hale, the Supreme Court considered whether a
corporate representative could invoke his or her own fifth amendment
privilege with respect to the contents of corporate documents. In Wilson v. United States,"0 a corporate president refused to produce subpoe-

66. Id.
67. Id. at 641.
68. See id. at 630 (citing Lord Camden's decision Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell St. Tr.
1029 (1762)).
69. Id. at 635.
70. See Heidt, supra note 13, at 444-50.
71. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
72. Heidt, supra note 13, at 440-48.
73. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
74. Id. at 74-75.
75. Id. at 74.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 74-75.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 74-76.
80. 221 U.S. 361, 369 (1911). Mr. Wilson, President of United Wireless Telegraph Com-
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naed documents on the ground that their contents may personally in-

criminate him.8 1 The Supreme Court stated that when documents are
subject to inspection under state law, "the custodian [of the documents] has no privilege to refuse production although their contents
may tend to incriminate him." 82 Writing for the Court, Justice Hughes
reasoned that when an individual takes custody of such documents, he
concedes to the state's right of inspection.8 3
The right of inspection, according to the Court, is derived from the
visitorial powers of the state. 84 Since a corporation receives privileges
from the state when operating in the corporate form, the state reserves
the right to inspect corporate documents kept in accordance with the
state's laws. 85 The Wilson Court concluded that this "reserved power of
visitation would seriously be embarassed, if not wholly defeated . . . if
guilty officers could refuse inspection of" 86 corporate documents on the
ground that the documents may personally incriminate the corporate
87

representative.
Thirty-four years after Wilson, the Supreme Court considered
whether the documents of an unincorporated organization were protected by the fifth amendment. United States v. White 8 involved a
union official who refused to produce subpoenaed documents on the
ground that the contents of the documents would personally incriminate him.89 The White Court determined that members, agents and officers affiliated with collective entities have no personal rights when act-

pany, was served a subpoena duces tecum requiring him to produce the letter-press copy books of
his company. Id. at 367-68. At the grand jury proceedings, Wilson admitted that the books requested were in his possession, however he claimed they were essential to his defense and refused
to produce them. Id. at 369.
81. Id. at 367-69.
82. Id. at 382. Two years later Justice Hughes held this judgment applicable to the former
sole shareholder of a defunct corporation. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 77 (1913). The
Grant decision held that it did not matter whether the title of the documents had passed to the
individual when the corporation concluded its business. Id. at 80. The Grant Court reasoned that
the status of the documents had not changed, and therefore, the state had the right to inspection.
Id.
83. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 382.
84. Id. The Wilson Court also referred to the Federal Government's right to inspect corporate documents when activities of the corporation are within congressional authority. Id.
85. Id. at 383-84.
86. Id. at 384-85.
87. Id.
88. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
89. Id. at 695-96. In White, a subpoena duces tecum had been served upon Local No. 542
of the International Union of Operating Engineers. Id. at 695. It demanded copies of union documents regarding the formation of the union and financial records pertaining to work-permit fees.
Id. A union representative appeared before the grand jury and identified himself as the Union's
-assistant supervisor." Id. He refused to produce the requested documents on the ground
that they
might have incriminated the Union, him, personally, or him, as an officer of the Union. id. at 696.
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ing on behalf of the entity.9" Instead, "they assume the rights, duties
and privileges" 9 1 possessed by the collective entity. 92 Therefore, since a
collective entity has no fifth amendment privileges, its representatives
have no such privilege when acting in their official capacity.9"
The Court, however, could not apply the above reasoning to respondent-White, until it had first determined whether a labor union
was a collective entity. Justice Murphy, who wrote the White Court's
opinion, outlined a test which focused upon the character of the organization, as well as the affiliation of its members, in order to determine
when an organization, such as a labor union, constitutes a collective
entity." Applying the test, the Court considered unions to be collective
entities. 95 Therefore, since the respondent-White was acting as a union
representative, he had no fifth amendment privilege.96
Prior to White, only documents of a corporation did not enjoy fifth
amendment protection under the privacy standard. Consequently, the
Supreme Court holding in White narrowed the privacy standard. After
White, the documents of any organization representing "common or
group interests"9 8 were not considered "private papers" protected by
the fifth amendment.
Thirty years after White, the Supreme Court considered whether
partners could invoke their fifth amendment privilege with respect to
9 a forthe contents of partnership records. In Bellis v. United States,"

90. Id. at 699.
91. Id.
92. Id. The White Court concluded that an entity representative did not conduct business in
his personal capacity. Id. Instead, the representative conducts business in an official capacity representing the collective entity. Id. For this reason, when the entity representative conducts business in his official capacity, he possesses rights commensurate with those of the entity. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
The test . . . is whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular
type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and
activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group interests only. If so,
the privilege cannot be invoked on behalf of the organization or its representatives in their
official capacity. Labor unions - national or local, incorporated or unincorporated - clearly
meet that test.
Id.
95. Id. at 700-01.
96. Id. Before White, the Court based its right to inspect corporate documents on the state's
visitorial powers. Id. The state, however, does not -have visitorial powers over the documents of
unincorporated organizations. Id. The Court stated that the authority to compel the production of
documents from unincorporated organizations is derived from the "inherent and necessary powers
of the federal and state government to enforce their laws .
Id. at 701.
97. See supra notes 66-96 and accompanying text.
98. White, 322 U.S. at 701.
99. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
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mer member of a small dissolved law partnership refused to produce
subpoenaed partnership financial records.100 The petitioner-Bellis contended that the partnership did not meet the collective entity requirements pronounced in White.'' According to petitioner-Bellis, since the
partnership represented personal interests rather than group interests,"0 2 the partnership's records were private papers protected under
10 3
the fifth amendment.
The Bellis Court stated that the White test was not helpful in defining collective entities such as partnerships because such entities possess a combination of personal interests and group interests. 4 Hence,
the Bellis decision suggests that the White test is not the definitive
method to determine whether documents of unincorporated organizations are protected under the fifth amendment." 5
Instead of the White test, the Bellis Court relied on the institutional identity of the partnership to determine the applicability of fifth
amendment privilege.' 0 6 Writing for the Bellis Court, Justice Marshall
stated that the partnership had "an established institutional identity
independent of its individual partners.' 0 7 In addition, the Court. determined that the records were held by Bellis in a representative capacity.' 0 8 Since the partnership was a collective entity and Bellis held the
records in a representative capacity, the Court determined that Bellis
had no "personal privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.' 0 9
The Bellis decision thus narrowed the Boyd privacy standard even further by excluding partnership records from fifth amendment protection.
The previous decisions discussed in this section establish the pa100. Id. at 86. Mr. Bellis was the former member of a three person partnership that had
been dissolved. Id. Bellis had departed and the partnership was winding up business. Id. Bellis, at
this point, obtained some of the partnership's records. Id. Shortly after this, Bellis was served a
subpoena requesting, inter alia, that he produce all partnership records in his possession. Id. Bellis
refused to comply on the ground that he was protected by his fifth amendment privilege. Id.
101. Id. at 100.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 95 n.2.
104. Id. The problem with the White test was that it set rigid classifications to determine
the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege to organizations. Organizations with purely personal interests in their members enjoyed fifth amendment privilege. White, 322 U.S. at 701. On
the other hand, organizations which embodied a common or group interest had no fifth amendment privilege. Id.; see supra note 94 and accompanying text. Hence, according to the Bellis
Court the White test provided no help in collective entity cases such as Bellis, in which the entity
possessed personal as well as group interests. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100.
105. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100-01.
106. Id. at 95, 101.
107. Id. at 95.
108. Id. at 97. The Court, determined that the financial records were not the private property of Bellis. Id. at 98. According'to Pennsylvania state partnership laws, the documents were the
property of the partnership. Id. at 96-99.
109. Id. at 101.
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rameters of the collective entity doctrine under the privacy standard.
Simply stated, corporations and unincorporated organizations, such as
labor unions and partnerships, are not afforded fifth amendment protection. In addition, individuals representing these entities are likewise
afforded no fifth amendment protection regarding the contents of entity
documents that may incriminate the individuals personally.
B.

Development of the Compelled Testimony Standard

Seventeen years prior to Bellis, the Supreme Court addressed the
collective entity case of Curcio v. United States."' Although the Supreme Court applied the privacy standard to collective entity cases
when Curcio was decided, the Curcio decision is presented at this point
since it is so closely related to the compelled testimony standard
adopted by the Court nineteen years later.
In Curcio, the Supreme Court considered whether an entity representative's oral testimony, requested by a federal grand jury, is protected by the representative's fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination."' Curcio's union was subpoenaed to produce documents
for a grand jury." 2 Curcio appeared before the grand jury but stated
that the documents were not in his possession." 3 Curcio refused to answer further questions pertaining to the documents on the ground that
his oral testimony might incriminate him in violation of the fifth
amendment."14 Justice Burton stated that requiring Curcio to give oral
testimony regarding the location and identity of those individuals who
possessed the documents was "more than 'auxiliary to the production'
of unprivileged corporate or association records.""15 The Court in
Curcio compared oral testimony given when answering questions, to
oral testimony given when authenticating or identifying documents for

110. 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
Ill. Id. at 118-19. The Court's focus in Curcio was upon petitioner-Curcio's oral testi-.
mony. Id. at 118-19, 124-28. Curcio is distinguished from the collective entity decisions of Boyd,
Hale, Wilson, White and Bellis because of Curcio's focus upon oral testimony. The Court in
Boyd, Hale, Wilson, White and Bellis focused on testimony/evidence to be derived from the contents of entity documents. See supra notes 65-109 and accompanying text. Curcio, on the other
hand, sought testimony derived from an entity representative's own personal knowledge. Curcio,
354 U.S. at 125-28.
112. Curcio, 354 U.S. at 119. Curcio was the secretary-treasurer of Local 269 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Id. at 119. He was served two subpoenas, one of which demanded he produce the union's books and records at a grand jury proceeding. Id. He testified at
the grand jury proceeding that the union had the requested documents; however, he did not possess the documents. Id. Further, he refused to answer any questions regarding who possessed the
documents or the documents' location, basing his denial on the fifth amendment. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
H 5. Id. at 125 (quoting United States v. Austin Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1929)).
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admission into evidence."' The latter oral testimony, according to Justice Burton, "merely makes explicit what is implicit""' 7 in the act of
production." 18
The Curcio Court seems to suggest that the testimony proffered by
the act of producing documents causes little threat of self-incrimination. However, Justice Burton determined that compelling the custodian to answer the questions regarding the documents "require[d] him
to disclose the contents of his own mind ... [which] is contrary to the
spirit and letter of the Fifth Amendment."' 1 9
In 1976, the Supreme Court considered Fisher v. United States.'20
Fisher involved an attorney who received an Internal Revenue summons to produce documents given to him by a client.' 2 ' The attorney
refused to produce the documents on the ground that the documents
would be incriminating to his client, and therefore, a violation of his
client's fifth amendment rights.' 22
Fisher was a turning point for the collective entity doctrine. The
Supreme Court abandoned the privacy standard of review pronounced
in Boyd and narrowed by Hale, Wilson, White, and Bellis.'1 3 In
Fisher, the Court switched to a compelled testimony standard of review. 24 The Fisher Court stated that "the prohibition against forcing
the production of private papers has long been a rule searching for a
rationale consistent with the proscriptions of the Fifth Amendment."' 1 5
The Court noted that the language of the fifth amendment did not
make it the "general protector of privacy.' 26 Instead, the Court stated
that the language of the fifth amendment focuses upon whether an individual has been compelled to be a witness against himself.' 27 There-

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 127. Although the Curcio Court held that the fifth amendment protected
Curcio
from testifying orally, he still could have been penalized for not producing
the requested documents. See id. at 127 n.7.
120. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
121. Id. at 394. The Fisher Court concluded that the attorney-client privilege
between
Fisher and his client did not bar production of the documents. Id. at 402-05.
According to the
Fisher Court, when a client has no fifth amendment protection regarding the
production of documents, the attorney-client privilege does not allow the attorney to refuse production
of the subpoenaed documents given to him by his client. Id. at 403-05;
122. Id. at 395.
123. See id. at 396-409.
124. See id. at 409-12.
125. Id. at 409.
126. Id. at 401. The Fisher Court stated that the concept of protecting the
disclosure of
private information was addressed in the fourth amendment. Id.
127. Id. at 396-98; "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness
against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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fore, a fifth amendment claim regarding subpoenaed documents should
address whether the individual subpoenaed is compelled to give selfincriminating testimony.' 28
According to the Fisher Court, the three ways testimony may be
created when an individual is compelled to produce documents are as
follows: The individual admits the documents exist; the individual admits the documents are in his possession; and the individual admits the
documents are the items sought by the subpoena.1 29 The Court suggested that when the above testimonial communications provide evidence that is not known by the party seeking the documents, the individual requested to produce the documents may refuse on the ground
that his act of production involves self-incriminating testimony protected by the fifth amendment." a
The Supreme Court applied the compelled testimony standard in
Fisher.The Court determined that the existence and the possession of
the documents requested were a foregone conclusion131 which contributed no valuable evidence to the government.'3 2 Further, the Court
found that Fisher's act of production did not authenticate the documents in Fisher's particular case.133 Therefore, the Court rejected
Fisher's claim and found that his act of producing the requested documents did not involve incriminating testimony protected by the fifth
34
amendment.'
Fisher had a profound impact on the collective entity doctrine.
Before Fisher,under the privacy standard, the Supreme Court focused
on whether the documents requested were private property or property
of the entity. If the documents were the property of the collective entity, they were not protected by the fifth amendment and the representative producing the documents on behalf of the entity possessed no
fifth amendment privilege.'3 5 In Fisher,under the compelled testimony
standard, the Supreme Court focused on whether the act of producing
documents would involve compelled testimonial communications cov-

128. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409.
129. Id. at 410.
130. See id. at 410-11.
131. Id. at 411.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 412-13. The Court explained that Fisher's production of the documents in question only expressed that he believed the documents were actually the authentic documents sought.
Id. Since the documents were the work papers of Fisher's accountant, the Court believed that
Fisher's production would not authenticate the documents. Id. at 113. Fisher "did not prepare the
papers and could not vouch for their accuracy." Id.
134. Id. at 411.
135. See supra notes 54-119 and accompanying text.
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ered by the fifth amendment. 136 If the communications were found to
be "sufficiently testimonial,' 3 7 the representative could refuse production on the ground that his acts were self-incriminating, and therefore,
protected by the fifth amendment.
Fisher, which was reaffirmed in Doe v. United States,138 caused
uncertainty in the circuit courts of appeals. The Second, Third, Fourth,
and Eleventh Circuits granted collective entity representatives fifth
amendment protection regarding the act of producing entity documents.' 19 However, the First, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
refused to allow collective entity representatives to enjoy fifth amendment privileges regarding the act of producing entity documents. 4" The
latter group of circuit courts viewed Fisher and Doe as decisions inapplicable in collective entity cases.' Therefore, these circuit courts continued to apply the privacy standard in collective entity cases.' 2 In order to resolve the conflict between the circuit courts, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Braswell v. United States.4 3

IV.

ANALYSIS

The United States Supreme Court heard Braswell v. United
States"' in order to resolve the split that occurred among the circuit
courts regarding the application of the collective entity doctrine under
the compelled testimony standard." 5 The primary issue in Braswell
was whether a corporate representative could refuse to produce corporate documents pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum on the ground that
his act of production would provide self-incriminating testimony protected under the fifth amendment." In addition, the Supreme Court
addressed whether the remedies proffered by Braswell, granting statutory immunity, or having an agent produce documents, were applicable
in collective entity cases. 4 7 The Supreme Court held that Braswell, as
the corporate representative, could not refuse compliance with the subpoena.' 48 Furthermore, the Court determined that neither proffered

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See supra notes 120-34 and accompanying text.
Id.; see supra note 130 and accompanying text.
465 U.S. 605 (1984); See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
See cases cited supra note 20.
See cases cited supra note 19.
Id.
Id.
Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 2287 (interim ed. 1988).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2294.
Id. at 2295.
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remedy was satisfactory."4 9 In an effort to determine the proper application of the collective entity doctrine under the compelled testimony
standard, the Braswell Court's rationale regarding the act of production and proffered remedies will henceforth be analyzed.
A.

Act of Production

The compelled testimony standard focuses upon whether a corporate representative's act of producing subpoenaed corporate documents
constitutes compelled testimonial self-incriminating communication,
protected by the fifth amendment.' 5 0 The petitioner-Braswell based his
claim on this standard. 5 ' The Supreme Court rejected Braswell's
claim, concluding instead that a corporate representative's act of production is not protected by the fifth amendment. 5 '
The Braswell majority discussed two reasons why petitioner-Braswell was not afforded fifth amendment protection. First, the court reasoned that the "agency rationale' 1 53 supporting the collective entity
doctrine precluded Braswell from invoking the fifth amendment; second, the production of documents by Braswell was "deemed not to constitute testimonial self-incrimination.' 5 4
1. The Agency Rationale
The agency rationale supporting the collective entity doctrine is
essentially derived from a combination of three Supreme Court decisions. 55 In 1886, the Supreme Court decision of Hale v. Henkle 5 1 determined that corporations have no fifth amendment privilege.' 5 7 Justice Brown noted in Hale that a corporation only possesses the rights
granted to it by the state, and protection against self-incrimination is
15 8
not one of these rights.

149. Id. at 2294-95.
150. See supra notes 110-142 and accompanying text.
151. Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2287. Braswell claimed "that his act of producing the documents has independent testimonial significance, which would incriminate him individually, and the
Fifth Arm'ndment prohibits government compulsion of that act." Id.
152. Id. at 2292.
153. See infra notes 154-69 and accompanying text.
154. Braswell, 108 S.Ct. at 2292.
155. The term "agency rationale" is used by the Braswell majority to depict a principle
"undergirding the collective entity decisions, . . . in which [entity representatives have claimed]
.... that production of entity records would incriminate them personally." Id. at 2291. While the
Court has utilized an agency rationale in a number of collective entity decisions, see cases cited
supra note 3, the meaning of this term is best understood in light of three particular Supreme
Court decisions: United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361 (1911); Hale v. Henkle, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
156. 201 U.S. 43 (1906); see supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
157. Hale, 201 U.S. at 74-75.
158. Id.
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The Supreme Court in Wilson v. United States' " determined that
corporate representatives possessed no fifth amendment privilege with
respect to producing corporate documents. 6 ' The Wilson Court reasoned that by assuming custody of corporate documents, an act which
enjoys no fifth amendment protection, the representative is "obligate[d]
to permit inspection . . . [of the documents] although their contents
tend"'' to incriminate the representative. 6 In other words, the representative waives his right to fifth amendment privilege when he takes
custody of corporate documents. 6 '
The Supreme Court, in United States v. White, 64 agreed that organization representatives possess no fifth amendment privilege. 6 5
However, the White Court articulated an agency rationale supporting
the collective entity doctrine. Thus, the White Court concluded that a
representative "assume[s] the rights, duties and privileges" ' 6 of the organization he represents.' 67 As a result, a representative acting on behalf of the corporation possesses no fifth amendment rights because the
corporation possesses no such rights." 8
The majority in Braswell stated that this agency rationale is still
valid under the compelled testimony standard. 6 9 Writing for the Braswell majority, Justice Rehnquist quoted the Wilson Court's pronouncement that an entity representative was obligated to produce the documents in his custody, even though the contents of the documents may
incriminate the representative. 7 0 In addition, Justice Rehnquist quoted
the White Court's conclusion, stating that a representative acting on
behalf of an organization assumed the position of the organization and
therefore has no fifth amendment privilege. " ' Justice Rehnquist further supported his determination by pointing out that the Supreme
Court's decision in Bellis v. United States7 2 relied on the agency ra-

159. 221 U.S. 361 (1911); see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
160. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 382.
161. Id. The Wilson Court explained that when a representative takes custody
of documents
"subject to examination by the demanding authority" (e.g. corporate
documents within the visitorial power of the state) the representative is obligated to allow inspection of
the documents. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. 322 U.S. 694 (1944); see supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
165. White, 322 U.S. at 699. Although White involved a labor union, the same
conclusion
would be valid for a corporation because both organizations are collective entities.
Id. at 699-700.
166. Id. at 699.
167. Id.
168. See White, 322 U.S. at 699-701.
169. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2290-91.
170. Id. at 2291 (quoting Wilson, 221 U.S. at 382).
171. Id. (quoting White, 322 U.S. at 699).
172. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
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tionale to conclude that Bellis possessed no fifth amendment rights. 7
While the Braswell majority is unquestionably correct that these prior
Supreme Court cases all support the agency rationale,1 74 the applicability of these decisions to Braswell and to the compelled testimony standard is questionable.
The Braswell dissent, written by Justice Kennedy, focuses attention on the fact that Wilson, White and Bellis all address the collective
entity doctrine under the privacy standard. 75 The privacy standard focuses on whether the subpoenaed documents are the "private papers"
of an individual.171 In all three cases, the entity representatives refused
to produce documents on the ground that the contents of the documents would tend to incriminate them.117 However, in his defense,
Braswell stated a claim different than those claimed in the above
cases. 7 8 Braswell argued that his "act1 79of producing the documents...
would incriminate him individually."'
The above trilogy never focused on the fifth amendment implicaRather, the opinions focused
tions regarding the act of production.'
on whether the requested documents were the property of the individuals who were compelled to produce the documents.' 8 The Braswell majority even recognized that the Bellis Court "did not focus on the testimonial aspect of the act of production."' 8 2 However, the Braswell
majority stated that it did "not think such a focus would have affected
the results reached."' 8 3
Justice Kennedy, in his dissent in Braswell, stated that the analysis in the decision should focus on the unique arguments made by Bras-

173. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2291.
174. See infra notes 156-69 and accompanying text. In Bellis the Supreme Court relied on
the representative's status to enforce the production of entity documents. Bellis, 417 U.S. at
95 97. The Supreme Court concluded that Bellis held documents that were "subject to the rights
granted to the other partners [in the company] by the state partnership law." Id. at 98. Hence,
the Bellis Court's decision supports the Braswell majority's position with respect to the agency
rationale.
175. See Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2297-98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The privacy standard
came to -,i end in 1976. See supra notes 80-109 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 65-109 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 80-109 and accompanying text.
178. See Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2298-99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The petitioner in Wilson refused to produce his corporation's documents on the ground that their contents might tend
to incriminate him. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 366. The respondent in White refused to produce union
documents on the ground that their contents might tend to incriminate him. White, 322 U.S. at
396. The respondent in Bellis claimed the documents requested were "private papers," and as
such they were protected by the fifth amendment. Bellis. 417 U.S. at 95, n.2.
179. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2287 (emphasis added).
180. See id. at 2288-90.
181. See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 98; White, 322 U.S. at 704; Wilson, 221 U.S. at 377.
182. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2291.
183. Id.
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well and not on prior cases. 184 The Braswell dissent is correct. The
Braswell majority based its opinion on claims entirely different than
Braswell's, thus weakening its argument considerably.
The Braswell majority's position is further weakened because the
conclusion it derived from the agency rationale is at odds with the
Court's prior decision in Curcio v. United States.1 85 The Braswell majority concluded that a corporate representative's act of production is
deemed to be an act of the corporation, and therefore is not protected
under the fifth amendment. 1 86 In Curcio, the Supreme Court held that
a collective entity representative's act of providing oral testimony was
protected by the fifth amendment. 8 7 Thus the Braswell majority's conclusion conflicts with the Curcio holding. 88
Presumably, the Braswell majority did not address this conflict because the majority thought that the Curcio decision distinguished oral
testimony from testimony derived from one's act of producing documents. The Braswell majority suggested that the Curcio decision precludes act of production testimony from receiving protection under the
fifth amendment.1 89 The Braswell majority recognized that the Curcio
Court did address the testimonial implications involved in the act of
production.1 90 However, according to the Braswell majority, the Curcio
Court did not believe that the testimony proffered in the act of production posed a significant threat to self-incrimination.91 In addition, the
Braswell majority viewed the Curcio decision as drawing a "line . . .
between oral testimony and other forms of incrimination." 1 92 Consequently, the Braswell majority viewed only the oral testimony of entity
representatives as being protected by the fifth amendment. 9 3
The Curcio Court determined that an individual's oral testimony
regarding the identification and authentication of documents "merely
makes explicit what is implicit in the act of production." 194 In addition,
the Curcio Court stated that answering questions regarding the documents is "more than 'auxiliary to the production." 9 5 of corporate docu-

184. Id. at 2298 (Kennedy, J.,dissenting).
185. 354 U.S. 118 (1957); see supra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
186. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2291.
187. Curcio, 354 U.S. at 127-28.
188. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2293.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2293-94.
192. Id. at 2293.
193. Id.
194. See Curcio, 354 U.S. at 125.
195. Id.
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ments. 196 The Curcio decision may support the Braswell majority's interpretation in that Curcio might suggest that the testimonial
implications from the act of production are not as threatening to self1 97 However, the holding in
incrimination as testimony given orally.
Curcio does not explicitly exclude act of production testimony from
fifth amendment protection. 198 For this reason, the Braswell majority's
determination that Curcio precludes production testimony merely because it is not oral testimony restricts what may be fairly drawn from
Curcio.
In order to determine whether the Curcio decision precludes production testimony, Braswell's production testimony must be analyzed in
9
the same manner as Curcio's oral testimony.' If this analysis indicates Braswell's production testimony is equivalent to Curcio's oral testimony, the Braswell majority's distinction is flawed.
The Braswell dissent contends that the act of production testimony
must receive fifth amendment protection because it is no different from
the oral testimony in Curcio.2"' The Curcio Court, however, only provided a brief explanation regarding why it determined that Curcio's
2
oral testimony was protected by the fifth amendment. "' According to
the Curcio Court, the oral testimony was protected because it com20 2 The Court
pelled Curcio "to disclose the contents of his own mind."
reasoned that forcing Curcio to testify orally regarding the location 20of3
documents required him to draw upon his own personal knowledge.
found that Curcio's testimony was protected
For this reason, the Court
20 4
amendment.
by the fifth
The Braswell dissent noted that Braswell's act of production also
2 0 5 Braswell's act
required him "to draw upon his personal knowledge."
of production provided testimony regarding the existence and location
2 6
of the documents sought by the subpoena. " In order to produce the
requested documents, Braswell was required to draw upon the contents
20 7 Hence, accordof his own mind to locate and select the documents.
ing to the Braswell dissent, Braswell would communicate his personal

196. Id. (quoting United States v. Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1929)).
197. Id.; see supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
198. See Curcio, 354 U.S. at 125-27.
199. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 2299-2300.
201. See Curcio, 354 U.S. at 128.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 125.
204. Id. at 125-28.
205. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2299, 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
206. See id. at 2297.
207. See id. at 2299, 2300.
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knowledge when producing the documents.2"' The dissent reasoned that
the testimony offered in Braswell's act of production is equivalent to
Curcio's oral testimony. The Braswell dissent appears correct in this
regard. Both individuals were required to disclose the location of subpoenaed documents. Furthermore, both individuals were asked to disclose what was in their minds in order to comply with the subpoena.
Consequently, when Braswell's act of production testimony is compared
to the oral testimony in Curcio, it is logical that Braswell's production
testimony should be protected by the fifth amendment.
Since the testimony offered by Braswell's act of production is
equivalent to the oral testimony in Curcio, the Braswell majority's distinction of Curcio is flawed. Although Curcio recognized a difference
between two types of testimony, the difference appears to be one of
form. Further, the Braswell dissent is correct in stating that the majority's conclusion drawn from the agency rationale conflicts with Curcio.
The Braswell majority concluded that the representative's act of production is an act of the corporation which is not protected by the fifth
amendment.20 9 The representative's act of production, however, was
shown to be equivalent to the act of giving oral testimony. Since the
oral testimony in Curcio was afforded fifth amendment protection by
the Supreme Court, Braswell's act of production testimony should likewise have been afforded fifth amendment protection.
2. Testimonial Self-Incrimination
The Supreme Court decisions of Fisher v. United States5 0 and
United States v. Doe2 ' address the possibility that self-incriminating
testimony may be conveyed by the act of producing subpoenaed documents. Fisher determined that the testimonial communications inherent
in the act of producing documents may be protected under the fifth
amendment.2 12 Although Doe did little more than reaffirm Fisher, Doe
has been recognized as the persuasive authority on the issue because
the Supreme Court allowed testimony gained from the act of producing
documents to be protected under the fifth amendment. 1 3

208. Id.
209. Id. at 2291.
210. 425 U.S. 391 (1976); see supra notes 120-42 and accompanying text.
211. 465 U.S. 605 (1984); see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
212. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 110. Although the Fisher decision stated that production testimony
was within the protection of the fifth amendment, the Fisher Court determined that Fisher's
testimonial communications created by his act of producing documents was not sufficient
to warrant
the protection. See id. at 410-11.
213. Doe, 465 U.S. at 613-14. Doe is also recognized because Doe unequivocally rejected
the privacy standard pronounced in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Doe, 465
U.S. at
618 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
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In Braswell, the petitioner contended that the precedent set by the
Supreme Court in these two decisions supported his fifth amendment
2 15
claim.2 14 The Braswell majority, however, rejected this contention.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reasoned that "[a] sole pro2 6 Hence,
prietor does not hold records in a representative capacity."
the Braswell majority considered Doe inapplicable because Doe in7
volved a sole proprietorship, which is not a collective entity.
The Braswell dissent, however, found Doe did apply to Braswell's
2
case. "' According to the dissent, a determination that Doe's sole proprietorships were not collective entities had no bearing on the decision's
applicability. 19 The Braswell dissent stated that "the potential for selfincrimination inheres in the act demanded of the individual, and as a
consequence the nature of the entity is irrelevant to determining
whether there is ground for the privilege. 2 20
The Braswell dissent appears correct. Although Doe involved a
sole proprietorship, the decision was applicable in Braswell with respect
to the precedent it set regarding act of production testimony. However,
the Doe precedent regarding act of production testimony merely reaffirmed the precedent set by Fisher.22 ' For this reason, the Braswell majority's decision to disregard Doe presumably had little or no effect on
the Braswell holding, since the majority recognized Fisher as being applicable to Braswell's case.222
The Braswell majority determined that precedent indicated that
Braswell's act of production does not produce testimony worthy of fifth
amendment protection. 2 3 According to the Braswell majority, the
Fisher decision pronounced that a custodian's act of producing corpo2
In
rate records does not constitute testimonial self-incrimination.
other words, the Braswell majority viewed the Fisherdecision as stand-

214. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2287. Braswell claimed "his act of producing the documents
has independent testimonial significance, which would incriminate him individually, and that the
Fifth Amendment prohibits government compulsion of that act." Id.
215. Id. at 2292 n.5 (rejecting support from Doe); id. at 2292 (rejecting support from
Fisher).
216. Id.
217. Id. A sole proprietorship never has been considered a collective entity within the parameters of the collective entity doctrine. See supra notes 54-140 and accompanying text; see also
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 192-93 (5th Cir.), affid. sub nom., .Braswell v.
United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (interim ed. 1988).
218. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2298-99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2298.
221. See Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2290.
222. Id. at 2291-92.
223. Id. at 2292.
224 ld.
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ing for the proposition that an entity representative's act of producing
requested documents is not sufficiently testimonial to warrant fifth
amendment protection.2 26 The Fisher Court stated that: "This Court
has ... time and again allowed subpoenas against ... collective entities
.. . over claims that the documents will incriminate the custodian despite the fact that producing the documents tacitly admits their existence and their location in the hands of their possessor."2 2 6 The quotation from Fisher suggests that the Fisher Court considered testimony
created by an entity representative's act of production to be insufficient
to warrant fifth amendment protection.
The Court's holding in Doe, however, contradicts this conclusion.
The testimony offered by the sole proprietor's act of producing subpoenaed documents in Doe was found by the Doe Court to be sufficiently
testimonial to warrant fifth amendment protection 2 7 When one focuses upon the act of production, there is no difference between a sole
proprietor and a sole shareholder of a closely-held corporation.2 The
act of producing subpoenaed documents may constitute testimonial
self-incrimination regardless of the position occupied by the individual.
This analysis indicates that a corporate representative's act of producing subpoenaed documents could quite possibly create testimony worthy of fifth amendment protection. Therefore, the Braswell majority is
arguably incorrect in its absolute conclusion that "a custodian's production of corporate records is deemed not to constitute testimonial
self-incrimination. 2' 2 9
In addition, it should be noted that some circuit courts and the
Braswell dissent do not adopt the Braswell majority's narrow reading
of Fisher.230 The Second, Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts
of Appeal read Fisher as extending fifth amendment protection to any

225. See id.; see also Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411 ("It is doubtful that implicitly admitting the
existence and position of papers rises to the level of testimony within the protection of the Fifth
Amendment."); see supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
226. See Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2292 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411). The Fisher Court
supports its statement by citing past collective entity decisions of Wilson, White and Bellis. The
Fisher Court also cites Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911), which was a companion case
to Wilson. Id. at 400. Dreier had refused to produce the subpoenaed records of his corporation on
the ground that the documents would incriminate him personally. Id. at 399. The only difference
between Wilson and Dreier was that the subpoena Dreier had received was addressed to him
personally rather than his corporation. Id. at 402. The Dreier Court determined that the name on
the subpoena did not excuse Dreier from his obligation to produce the corporate documents he
held because the documents were not his "private papers." Id.
227. Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13.
228. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2298 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Braswell is the sole shareholder
of two closely-held corporations. See also supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
229. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2292.
230. See cases cited supra note 20; Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2298 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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entity representative whose act of production conveys testimonial selfincriminating communications."' These circuit courts focus on the individual's act of production. If the individual's act of production proves
the documents exist, proves the documents are in the individual's control or the documents are in fact the items sought by the subpoena,
then the party requested to produce the documents should receive fifth
amendment protection. 32 Hence, these circuit courts follow the com2 33
pelled testimony standard pronounced by Fisher.
B.

Remedies

Petitioner-Braswell contended that having the corporation select
an agent to produce requested documents would allow the government
access to the desired information, without involving a representative
3 4 The suggested
who might be incriminated by producing documents.
procedure entails addressing the subpoena to the corporation and then
allowing the corporation to select an agent who can produce the records
without incriminating himself.23 5 Braswell insisted that he could not be
required to help the appointed agent locate the records since any statement to the agent would be a testimonial self-incriminating communication.2'3 Petitioner-Braswell makes a valid argument. The agent would
not risk self-incrimination, and therefore, could legally be required to
23 7 For this
give testimony regarding how he acquired the documents.
reason, Braswell's production to the agent's testimony would be no different than his production to the grand jury. The grand jury could still
determine from the agent's testithony who had produced the
documents.
The fact that Braswell would not aid the appointed agent
prompted the Braswell majority to find the agency remedy unsatisfactory.23 8 According to the Court, since the agent would not receive any
information regarding the location of the documents, he would "essentially be sent on an unguided search. ' 23 9 If the case involved a sole
shareholder corporation, like Braswell, that shareholder could easily be

231. See cases cited supra note 20. Although these decisions allow entity representatives the
protection of the fifth amendment, the collective entities are still required to produce the subpoenaed documents by appointed agents or otherwise.
232. Id.
233. See supra notes 120-42 and accompanying text.
234. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2294.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. Id.
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the only person who knows where the documents are located.24 0 For
this reason, the Braswell majority viewed the appointment of an agent
as a remedy that will not ensure the production of desired
documents.241
There are two circuit courts of appeals that do not share the Braswell majority's apprehension of appointing an agent." 2 In situations
in
which the corporate representative would be incriminated by his act
of
production testimony, the eleventh and the second circuits suggested
that the corporation could select an agent outside the corporate structure to produce the documents. 4 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that a corporate representative would not "commit a testimonial act by providing general corporate records to an agent selected
by the corporation. 2 44 But the Eleventh Circuit did not offer an explanation as to why the representative's act of producing documents for an
agent would be any different from the representative's act of producing
documents for a grand jury.245
There is, however, an explanation that supports the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion. The court could have ordered Braswell to have his
attorney produce the documents. If Braswell's attorney is considered
his agent, the testimonial self-incriminating communications created, if
and when Braswell produced the documents, would be protected by
Braswell's attorney-client privilege.246 Since Braswell's testimonial
communications could be considered confidential disclosures made
to
his attorney, there is no risk associated with his attorney providing testimony regarding Braswell himself and the production of documents. 247
Appointing Braswell's attorney as an agent would have enabled Braswell to assist the agent-attorney in locating the requested documents
and would have prevented the "unguided search"24 8 that concerned the
Braswell Court. Thus, when an appointed agent is the attorney of the
corporate representative who is requested to produce documents, the
agency remedy suggested by petitioner-Braswell appears satisfactory.
Braswell further contended that the testimonial communications
provided from his act of production could be granted statutory immu-

240. Id.
24 I.Id.
242. See In re Grand Jury No. 86-3 (Will Roberts Corp.), 816 F.2d
569 (11 th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Sancetta, 788 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1986).
243. See In re Grand Jury No. 86-3, 816 F.2d at 574; Sancetta, 788
F.2d at 74-75.
244. In re Grand Jury No. 86-3, 816 F.2d at 574. Sancetta did not
comment on the testimony offered when a representative produces documents to an agent. Sancetta,
788 F.2d at 74-75.
245. See In re Grand Jury No. 86-3 816 F.2d at 574.
246. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2292 (1961).
247. See id.
248. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2294.
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nity from prosecution.2 49 The grant of immunity would bar the government from using testimony against Braswell which was gained from his
act of production.2 5 The government, therefore, could not use Braswell's act of production to prove the documents existed, the documents
were in Braswell's possession or that the documents were in fact the
items sought by the subpoena.2 51
The Braswell majority determined that granting statutory immu52 The majority noted that if the
nity was an unsatisfactory remedy.
government decided to prosecute Braswell individually, the government
2 5 According to Braswell,
would face an increased burden of proof.
once the custodian demonstrates that he testified under a grant of immunity, the government must meet a "heavy burden of proving that all
of the evidence it purposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources." '2 5 Although only the act of production testimony would
be protected in such a circumstance, the Braswell majority reasoned
that a grant of immunity might affect other areas of the government's
prosecution.25 5 The Braswell majority stated that the higher burden of
proof might prevent the admissibility of evidence that the government
is permitted to use.256 Due to the possible adverse effect upon evidence
outside that which is protected, the Braswell majority concluded that
would harm the prosecution's efforts in collective
granting immunity
2 57
cases.
entity
Granting of statutory immunity may have some negative effect

249. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 6002-6003 (1970).
250. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding .. . and the person presiding over the
proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this part [18 U.S.C.S.
§ 6001], the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order
(or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
Id.
251. See Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 2294.
253. id. at 2294-95; see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461-62 (1972). Kastigar
involved two individuals the government believed would invoke their fifth amendment privilege if
called upon to testify. Id. at 442. The government granted statutory immunity to the individuals'
testimony; however, the indivduals refused to testify on the ground that the immunity "statute was
not co-extensive with the scope of the [fifth amendment] privilege against self-incrimination." Id.
The Supreme Court found that the immunity statute was co-extensive with the fifth amendment.
Id. at 462.
254. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295 (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461-62).
255. Id. at 2295.
256. See id.
257. Id. at 2294.
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upon the prosecutorial efforts of the government. Any evidence the government intends to use regarding the existence, authentication or possession of documents must be proven to have been obtained from a
source other than the act of production of the protected individual.25 8
Proving an independent source of such evidence could make prosecution more difficult.
The Braswell majority is also correct because other evidence
outside that which is protected by a grant of immunity may be affected. The Supreme Court decision of Kastigar v. United States25 9 explained that the testimony protected by a grant of immunity cannot be
used as an "investigatory lead."2 6 Thus the government will be prevented from expanding its investigation if information obtained from
the protected individual's act of production implicates questionable
conduct unrelated to the government's original investigation. It is questionable, however, whether the magnitude of these negative effects justified the Braswell majority's conclusion that granting statutory immunity is an unsatisfactory remedy.
Although there are drawbacks to statutory immunity, the negative
factors are not so great as to outweigh the statute's utility. The government can acquire the requested documents and the individual possessing the documents can be afforded protection equal to that offered by
the fifth amendment. 6 1 In addition, the government is able to use the
contents of the documents to prosecute any individual, including the
individual who is granted immunity.26 2 The only evidence the government cannot use is the testimony created by the act of production
which shows the existence, the authenticity, and the individual's possession of the documents.
However, the government can use means other than the act of production to prove the tacit averments created by producing documents.2 6 3 According to the Braswell majority's argument these tacit
averments are not sufficient testimony to warrant fifth amendment protection.26 4 Consequently, if the government cannot prove these tacit
averments by means other than the act of production, the magnitude of
the testimony forfeited by the government will not be of great significance. Hence, affording the individual his fifth amendment rights and
258. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-62 (1972).
259. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
260. Id. at 460.
261. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also
Kastigar 406 U.S. at
462 (court held that immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970), was
co-extensive with the fifth
amendment).
262. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
263. Id.
264. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2292; see supra notes 120-42 and accompanying
text.
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affording the government access to the documents, without a significant
forfeiture of evidence, will assure that the granting of statutory immunity is satisfactory.
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's holding in Braswell v. United
States26 5 places the collective entity doctrine in the position it occupied
prior to the compelled testimony standard. The Supreme Court applied
the agency rationale supporting the collective entity doctrine to conclude that corporate representatives have no fifth amendment protection because their act of producing subpoenaed documents is an act of
the corporation, not the individual. 6 A reviewing court applying this
conclusion to collective entity cases would never reach the cuestion
whether the testimonial communications inherent in the act of production are self-incriminating. But apparently the Supreme Court did not
want to leave the question open for future decision. Therefore, the
Court determined that the compelled testimony standard pronounced in
Fisher v. United States 6 7 was not applicable to collective entity cases.
After rejecting the representative's ability to invoke fifth amendment
protection, the Supreme Court went further and denounced other protection from self-incrimination sought by corporate representatives.
The Supreme Court rejected a grant of statutory immunity due to
the negative effect it posed on the prosecution of collective entity
cases.2" 8 However, when these negative effects were analyzed in light of
the positive factors derived from granting statutory immunity, the analysis indicated that the granting of immunity would be a satisfactory
remedy to prevent self-incrimination. In addition, the Supreme Court
rejected the apparently feasible remedy of allowing the representative
9
to appoint an agent to produce the subpoenaed documents.
Hence, the United States Supreme Court set forth in Braswell
what five Justices2 70 view as the proper application of the collective entity doctrine. The compelled testimony standard is not a part of that
doctrine. Consequently, the collective entity doctrine is back to a privacy standard and the effect of Braswell on future cases may be determined by looking to past collective entity decisions. Such decisions

265. 108 S. Ct. 2284 (interim ed. 1988).
266. Id.
267. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
268. See supra notes 249-64 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 234-41 and accompanying text.
270. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court's opinion
and was joined by J. White, J. Blackmon, J. Stevens, and J. O'Conner. Id.
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often have held that representatives of collective entities have no fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and must therefore
produce entity documents when they are subpoenaed.
Robert Dixon Windus
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